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Marburg virus disease, Lassa fever, monkeypox, and Ebola virus diseases of humans haveall
been recognized since 1967. These are examples of some of the exotic virus diseases which
through importation may present a potential public health problem in the United States. Some
of these viruses are also highly hazardous to laboratory and medical personnel. This paper is a
review of the general characteristics, the epidemiology, and laboratory diagnosis of the exotic
viruses which have been described during the last 25 years.
Epidemics of hemorrhagic fever, now known to be caused by arenaviruses, were
first recognized in Argentina in 1956 [1], in Bolivia in 1959 [2], and in West Africa in
1969 [3]. In 1967 a hemorrhagic disease outbreak caused by a newlyrecognized virus,
the Marburg virus, occurred simultaneously among laboratory workers in Germany
and Yugoslavia [4]. In 1976 extensive outbreaks of severe hemorrhagic fever, caused
by still another newly recognized virus, the Ebola virus, occurred in Southern Sudan
and Northern Zaire [5]. It was inthis same general region that the first case ofhuman
monkeypox had been detected in 1970 [6]. Few students of virology in the United
States are likely to encounter these diseases and the viruses which cause them. Some
of these diseases, however, represent a potential public health problem in that they
may be imported through infected travelers. Some of these viruses are also highly
hazardous to laboratory and medical personnel. In this paper I will review the general
characteristics, the epidemiology, and laboratory diagnosis of the "exotic"' viruses
which have been recognized during the last 25 years.
THE ARENAVIRUSES OF MAN
The first member of the arenavirus family to be isolated was the virus of
lymphocytic choriomeningitis (LCM) in 1934. By the late thirties and early forties,
much was known about LCM virus and its association with rodents, particularly
mice, which serve as bothvirus vectors and reservoirs[6]. There are nowten, possibly
eleven, viruses recognized as belonging to the arenavirus taxon [7]. All share the
property of natural persistent infection of rodents. Four are known to be pathogenic
for man: LCM virus, Junin virus, Machupo virus, and Lassa fever virus. The
arenaviruses are spherical or pleomorphic, with diameters ranging between 60 and
250 mm. By electron microscopy the virion may be seen to contain electron dense
particles which resemble sand (arenaceous), from which the taxon name is derived
[8]. The virus surface is covered with projections. The viruses contain RNA. They
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laboratory.
Epidemiology
LCM infections of humans may cause influenza-like disease, meningoencephalitis,
or aseptic meningitis. Although LCM virus can often cause severe disease, deaths are
rare. LCM viruses have been estimated to cause nearly 8 percent of the acute central
nervous system infections of virus etiology, but incidence of the disease may vary
considerably in various geographical locations. In the U.S.A. it is thought to be far
lower than 8 percent, although precise figures are not available. In recent years 181
proven human LCM infections were associated with pet hamsters in the United
States [9].
Epidemics of Junin virus disease (Argentine hemorrhagic fever) were recognized in
the early 1950s in the farming regions northwest of Buenos Aires [1]. The disease is
now recognized as endemic for an area five times that originally believed to be
affected. The disease is characterized by an acute febrile period followed by renal,
hematological, neurological, and cardiovascular changes. There is little evidence of
subclinical infections. The more severe forms of the disease, associated with hemor-
rhagic manifestations, convulsions, profuse bleedings, and shock, are less common.
The case mortality rate is 10-20 percent. In nonfatal cases convalescence may be
slow, with patients suffering fatigue for many weeks. Several hundred cases ofJunin
virus infections are reported each year in Argentina, but the number of cases may
vary, depending on climatic and other ecological factors.
Machupo virus disease (Bolivian hemorrhagic fever) clinically resembles Junin
virus infections, with malaise, fever, headache, and myalgia. Like infections with
Junin virus, Bolivian hemorrhagic fever has a case fatality rate of 10-20 percent [2].
The number of cases annually of Bolivian hemorrhagic fever initially reported was
similar to that for Junin virus, but cases decreased drastically after a rodent control
program was initiated [2].
Lassa fever may clinically resemble Argentine or Bolivian hemorrhagic fever, but
severe Lassa fever virus infections often cause liver disease, pneumonia, myocarditis,
and a host of other complications, including permanent neurological deafness [3].
Large amounts of virus may circulate in the blood of patients for several weeks after
disease onset, in spite of the development of virus-specific antibodies. The case
fatality rate for Lassa fever was originally reported to average 50-60 percent but the
rate is now conceded to be less than half that with the increasing recognition of less
specific symptomatology. No reliable figures are available on the total incidence of
Lassa fever, but present evidence indicates that the disease occurs in large areas in the
plateau regions of West Africa [10].
Arenaviruses are maintained in nature through persistent or long-term infections
of various rodent species. LCM virus is most frequently associated with Mus
musculus, Lassa fever virus with Mastomys natalensis in West Africa, Machupo virus
with Calomys callosus in Bolivia, and Junin virus with at least three different
cricetine rodent species in Argentina [5]. Humans are accidental hosts with infection
occurring through a complex rodent-virus transmission pattern. Primary route of
transmission to humans is generally thought to occur through contamination offood,
water, or air by rodents, primarily through urine, or by inoculation of excreta
through skin abrasions. Humans are infected primarily through infected rodents
invading human habitats [10]. The exception is Junin virus infection, which is an
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harvest time. The precise mechanism of Junin virus transmission is unknown.
Only Lassa fever virus appears to have the characteristic ability for human-to-
human transmission. Nosocomial cycles of infection in remote West African hospi-
tals have been well documented. Secondary spread may also occur among members
of household groups, but it is difficult to differentiate between human transmission
and single-source infections [10].
Each of these four arenaviruses represent a significant hazard to laboratory
workers, and all should be handled only under strict conditions of containment.
Laboratory Diagnosis
Arenaviruses in general may be isolated and identified from blood, throat
washings, urine, or specimens taken from lung or visceral organs at autopsy [8]. The
preferred method of identification of arenaviruses is by fluorescent antibody (FA)
test [11]. Although the virus may be identified directly in tissue specimens, the most
successful method of rapid identification is the inoculation of virus into Vero cell
cultures; the virus can then be identified by FA test within three days after the
inoculation. The indirect fluorescent antibody (IFA) test is preferred for serologic
diagnosis of arenaviruses. It is less time-consuming and more sensitive than the
complement fixation (CF) test. Serologic diagnosis may be made on paired sera
collected during acute and convalescent phases of the illness. By the IFA test,
antibodies may be detected in Lassa fever patients as early as the second week of
illness and may reach a peak one to two weeks later [11]. CF antibodies are usually
much slower in development and may not be detected until the third or fourth week
after onset of illness. Although there is some known antigenic crossing, IFA tests on
sera from convalescent patients are diagnostic of Lassa fever and LCM virus
infections [12]. Junin and Machupo viruses are so closely related that a highly
specific neutralization test is necessary for differentiation.
Treatment and Control
There are no vaccines available for the arenaviruses. Plasma from convalescent
patients has been used to treat patients severely ill with Lassa, Bolivan, or Argentin-
ian hemorrhagic fevers. Some evidence suggests that high titered plasma may be
efficacious during the first week ofdisease[3], but no control studies have been done.
The key to the control of arenavirus infections of humans is the reduction of the
opportunity for exposure to the reservoir-vector rodent [10]. Rodent control has
been highly successful in curtailing Bolivian hemorrhagic fever. Studies in West
Africa are now under way to determine if rodent control may also reduce human
disease with Lassa fever virus. However, control of Junin virus through rodent
control in the wild may be a much more difficult task. Vaccines, of course, would be
useful for protection of personnel who are at highest risk of infection with arenavi-
ruses, such as farm workers in Argentina, and hospital, laboratory, and staff
personnel in the Lassa fever endemic areas of West Africa.
AFRICAN HEMORRHAGIC FEVER VIRUSES
This term has been used to describe Marburg and Ebola viruses, both of which
appear to originate in Africa.
Marburg and Ebola viruses are morphologically similar but antigenically distinct
[13]. Both viruses are seen under the electron microscope (EM) as medium-sized,
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tions. These viruses may superficially resemble rhabdoviruses by EM, but the bizarre
morphological forms are shared with no other known virus group. Both are RNA
viruses. Marburg and Ebola viruses may be differentiated ina laboratory by FA tests
with specific antisera.
Epidemiology
The first recognition of Marburg virus disease was in 1967 when it caused
outbreaks among 31 persons in Marburg and Frankfurt, Germany, and Belgrade,
Yugoslavia [4]. Twenty-five of the cases were among laboratory workers who had
been in direct contact with infected monkeys imported from Uganda. Seven patients
died. A second outbreak of Marburg virus occurred in Johannesburg, South Africa,
in 1975, apparently as a result of the index case contracting the disease in Rhodesia
[13].
The first outbreak of Ebola virus disease was recognized in the fall of 1976 in
Northern Zaire and Southern Sudan [14]. The outbreak involved an estimated 500
cases and 350 deaths.
Differential diagnosis of a disease in a patient in Central Africa or in someone
havingjust returned from a tour ofthe bush inthe same region may be difficult, since
infections with either of the viruses at certain stages of disease may resemble Lassa
fever, malaria, typhoid fever, or yellowfever[15]. A sudden onset offever, headache,
and malaise, followed by chest discomfort, diarrhea, and vomiting, in a patient with
a history of travel to rural Central Africa should alert the physician to consider
Marburg or Ebola virus infections in making a differential diagnosis.
The reservoirs of Marburg and Ebola viruses are not known. Because the original
outbreak of Marburgvirus disease was associated with contact oflaboratory workers
with infected vervet monkeys, the disease was initially described as the "green
monkey disease," but monkeys are probably accidental hosts, along with humans.
Extensive studies of insects, rodents, snakes, and primates from the area in which the
index case of Marburg disease in South Africa was assumed to have become infected
failed to reveal any evidence of the virus [13]. However, the outbreaks of the disease
in Marburg, Germany, and South Africa have demonstrated that person-to-person
transmission of the virus can occur through close contact, although this route of
infection is probably not an effective or common one.
No nonhuman vectors were incriminated in the investigations of the Ebola
epidemic in the Sudan and Zaire, and the source ofthe original infection has not been
determined. Infection seemed to spread only as a result of close contact with an
infected person. In Zaire, where the case fatality rate was much higher than in the
Sudan, parenteral injections with contaminated equipment played a major role in
transmission. Patients infected in the hospital environment appeared to have carried
the infection back to the villages [14].
Laboratory Diagnosis
Because of the potential for spread of fatal infections among household and
medical personnel, a laboratory diagnosis of Marburg or Ebola virus infections must
be made rapidly [13]. A rapid presumptive diagnosis can be made by EM by
recognizing the characteristic virus morphology in liver and serum specimens and by
specific FA in liver cell suspensions. Both viruses may be isolated from blood and
throat specimens through inoculation of Vero cells or interperitoneal inoculation of
guinea pigs. Both viruses may beidentified in Vero cells by FA or EM within three or
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be made during late stages of the disease or during the convalescence period by CF
and fluorescent antibody test [13]. All laboratory procedures should be carried out
only in maximum containment facilities.
Treatment and Control
No vaccines are available for protection against Marburg or Ebola viruses. As with
the arenaviruses, there is some suggestion that plasma from convalescent patients
may be helpful during early stages of the disease. Outbreaks may be controlled
through quarantine of infected persons [15].
MONKEYPOX VIRUS INFECTIONS IN MAN
The last naturally occurring case of smallpox was recorded in Merka Town,
Somalia, in October 1977. The eradication of smallpox is, indeed, a tribute to
international cooperation in public health [16]. The principles on which the global
smallpox eradication program were based were that humans are the only natural
hosts and the only vectors of variola, that no carrier status exists, and that
vaccination can provide virtually complete protection. From the success of the
program to date, it would appear that these principles are valid [17]. However, some
questions still remain. Will smallpox reappear from hidden foci in remote popula-
tions? Is there a danger of infection from variola virus from inanimate objects? Are
there possible animal reservoirs of variola or variola-like virus? Will other animal
poxviruses fill theecological niche left by the eradication ofsmallpox? Finally, are we
risking defeat of the smallpox eradication program by maintaining variola virus
strains in laboratories?
Experience to date by the WHO suggests that the probability of smallpox
reappearing from unrecognized foci in human populations is remote. Smallpox has
not reappeared in any country after having been certified as smallpox-free [17].
It is also unlikely that smallpox will reappear as a result of reactivation of virus
from inanimate objects. Althoughthere have been anecdotal reports ofcontaminated
blankets and crusts being infectious for years, present evidence suggests that, in the
tropical areas where contaminated objects were most likely to be found, the scabs
were rendered noninfectious in less than a month. Furthermore, evidence is also
strong that all of the outbreaks investigated over the past 12 years have been
epidemiologically linked with a known human case [16].
It is premature to rule out the possible survival ofvariola or variola-like viruses in
animal reservoirs. Some cause for concern arises from the so-called wild whitepox
strains, which have been isolated from a chimpanzee, a wild monkey, and two
rodents in Zaire, as well as from cynomolgus kidney cell cultures in a European
laboratory. Biologically these strains cannot be distinguished fromvariolavirus. The
significance of these viruses is not clear [16].
Of immediate concern, however, is the increasing recognition ofthe occurrence of
monkeypox infection of humans. As smallpox has been eliminated, an increasing
number of monkeypox infections among humans have been recognized. From 1970
to 1979, 44 cases of monkeypox have been reported from the tropical rain forest
regions of West and Central Africa. The disease closely resembles smallpox, with a
case fatality rate of 10-15 percent [16]. However, there is only limited evidence of
human-to-human transmission. Some of those infected had received smallpox
vaccination as late as five years before. All cases occurred in areas of small villages
where people are hunters and frequently contact a variety of wild animals.
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Present evidence suggests that the name "monkeypox" is a misnomer and that
monkeys, like humans, are accidental hosts. Monkeypox viruses have never been
isolated in the wild, alhtough a low prevalence of orthopoxvirus neutralizing
antibodies has been demonstrated in nonhuman primates in those areas where
human monkeypox cases have been reported.
Variants of monkeypox virus which biologically resemble smallpox can be isolated
in the laboratory. These findings have raised questions as to whether monkeypox
could be a progenitor of smallpox. Work is presently under way to investigate the
DNA characteristics to determine more precisely the genetic relationship of these
variants to smallpox, but at this point monkeypox virus is not considered to be a
significant threat.
Finally, a word about the retention of smallpox viruses in laboratories. The recent
experience in Birmingham, England, where primary and secondary cases ofsmallpox
were associated with a virus laboratory, serves to remind us that smallpox infections
may occur if laboratory safety conditions are inadequate [18]. The WHO has made
strict recommendations for laboratory facilities where the virus is maintained and
have urged all countries without such facilities to destroy the virus. The WHO has
designated three laboratories as smallpox centers: Institute of Viral Preparations,
Moscow; National Institute for Medical Research, London; and CDC, Atlanta.
Retention of the smallpox strains is required for rapid comparative studies on newly
emerged variants or isolates which may resemble smallpox virus.
OTHER EXOTIC VIRAL DISEASES
Although not considered potential public health problems in the U.S., hemor-
rhagic fever with viral syndrome, Crimean/Congo hemorrhagic fever, and Rocio
encephalitis should be added to the list of exotic viral diseases recognized in the last
25 years.
Hemorrhagic fever with viral syndrome (HFRS) occurs over wide areas of Korea,
China, U.S.S.R., and Finland. The virus associated with this disease in Korea was
isolated for the first time in 1978 [19]. Like the arenaviruses, the virus of HFRS
occurs in small rodents and is presumably transmitted to man through rodent
excreta. There is no evidence of person-to-person transmission.
Crimean hemorrhagic fever has been known to be caused by a virus since 1945, but
only more recently has it been characterized and shown to be similar to the Congo
virus from Africa [20]. The member of the Bunyaviridae family causes epidemics in
Bulgaria and the Soviet Union and sporadic cases in Pakistan and East Africa. The
disease is associated with tick-biting activity, primarily of the Hyalomma genus.
Mortality may range between 3 and 30 percent. Nosocomial outbreaks among
hospital personnel have occurred in Pakistan and the Soviet Union.
Rocio encephalitis was first recognized in 1975 in epidemic form in Sao Paulo
State, Brazil [21]. The case fatality ranged from 5-25 percent. Rocio virus is a group
B arbovirus and, as such, has the potential to spread to other areas.
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